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_____________________
OPINION
_____________________
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Before the Court are a set of cross-appeals from three
separate orders issued by the District Court of the United
States Virgin Islands. Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the District
Court dismissed three of the five counts of the defendants‘
counterclaim; the defendants appeal in part. After discovery,
the District Court granted summary judgment to the
defendants as to the plaintiff‘s two federal claims; the
plaintiff appeals in part. The summary judgment order also
dismissed without prejudice the plaintiff‘s remaining
territorial-law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), on the
ground that no federal causes of action remained in the case.
A separate order filed a few days later sua sponte dismissed
the defendants‘ two remaining territorial-law counterclaims
for the same reason; the defendants appeal. We will affirm
the entry of summary judgment on the plaintiff‘s copyright
claim, but will vacate the District Court‘s decisions
dismissing the counterclaims.
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I
Sarah Bunge and Thomas Friedberg (―the owners‖)
wanted to build a home in the Virgin Islands. They
approached Michael Milne, an architect who at the time was
vice-president and director of the Virgin Islands architectural
firm Village Vernacular, Inc. While still a Village employee,
Milne began work on the project. The owners executed a
letter of intent and paid a $1,000.00 deposit to hire Village on
June 10, 1999. Milne prepared a series of sketches and
preliminary drawings for the project, and the owners paid
another $6,650.00 to Village on October 5, 1999. All the
drawings and all of Milne‘s correspondence throughout 1999
bore Village‘s imprint. In April 2000, Milne submitted
conceptual drawings for the project to the Virgin Islands
Department of Planning and Natural Resources, the local
permitting body; these drawings were also marked with
Village‘s legend.
Village was, however, in the process of getting out of
the active practice of architecture, so Milne needed someplace
else to ply his trade. At some point in 1999 or 2000—the
record contains no evidence of the exact date—Milne formed
a second corporation, Barefoot Architect, Inc., where he
continued his architecture practice and served as owner and
president. Bunge and Friedberg wanted to continue working
with Milne, and on August 31, 2000 they entered into a
standard American Institute of Architects (AIA) contract to
engage Barefoot‘s architectural services. The agreement calls
for a contract price of $123,495.00 covering ―basic services,‖
a category defined in the contract‘s Article 2. The contract
4

also defines ―additional services,‖ which were to be billed at
$85.00 per hour over and above the ―basic services‖ price.
By June 7, 2001, the owners had paid more than the
entire ―basic services‖ price, but had yet to receive full
construction drawings. Barefoot nevertheless demanded that
it be paid a further $281,698.43 for ―contingent additional
services,‖ which it claims to have rendered on account of
major changes to the project initiated by the owners. Neither
side was happy with this state of affairs; angry
correspondence ensued. The owners refused to pay for the
―contingent additional services,‖ and on December 11, 2001,
Milne sent them a letter on Barefoot letterhead stating that his
firm was suspending its architectural services pursuant to
subparagraph 8.1 of the contract. The owners reacted by
hiring Tracy Roberts of Springline Architects, LLC to replace
Barefoot and to finish the project.
Barefoot filed suit on July 27, 2004, alleging that
Bunge, Friedberg, Roberts, and Springline had violated its
copyright in the home design. The complaint also asserted
claims for violation of the Lanham Act and breach of
contract. In addition to an answer, the defendants filed five
counterclaims: breach of contract, fraud, breach of fiduciary
duty, violation of the Lanham Act, and tortious interference
with contractual relations. Barefoot moved to dismiss the
counterclaims, and on June 22, 2007 the District Court
granted the motion as to the fraud, Lanham Act, and tortious
interference claims, leaving the contract and fiduciary duty
counterclaims intact.
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On September 9, 2008—after the court‘s decision on
the motion to dismiss—Barefoot and Village executed a
―Memorandum of Transfer,‖ which purported to memorialize
an October 5, 1999 oral transfer of the copyright to the
project‘s design from Village to Barefoot. Milne signed this
memorandum on behalf of both firms (as Village‘s vicepresident and director, and as Barefoot‘s president); Glenn
Speer, as Village‘s president, also signed on his firm‘s behalf.
The defendants then moved for summary judgment,
which the District Court granted with respect to the Copyright
Act and Lanham Act claims. The court proceeded to decline
supplemental jurisdiction over Barefoot‘s breach-of-contract
claim, dismissing it without prejudice. Shortly thereafter, the
District Court sua sponte dismissed the remaining counts of
the counterclaim (for breach of contract and of fiduciary
duty), which were also territorial-law claims over which it
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
The parties cross-appealed. Barefoot asks only that we
reinstate its copyright claim. The defendants/counterclaimants
limit their appeal to the tortious interference, breach of
contract, and breach of fiduciary duty counterclaims.
II
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review district court decisions regarding both summary
judgment and dismissal for failure to state a claim under the
same de novo standard of review. Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d
318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009) (summary judgment); Santiago v.
GMAC Mortg. Group, Inc., 417 F.3d 384, 386 (3d Cir. 2005)
6

(motion to dismiss). Summary judgment should be granted
only when the record ―shows that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.‖ Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). While
―[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor‖ in
determining whether a genuine factual question exists,
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986),
summary judgment should not be denied unless there is
sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably find for the
nonmovant. Id. at 249; Giles, 571 F.3d at 322. To withstand a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, ―a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‗state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.‘‖ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___
U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
The doctrine of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), applies to cases decided by the federal courts over
what would be state-law claims if the Virgin Islands were a
state. Edwards v. Hovensa, LLC, 497 F.3d 355, 360–61 (3d
Cir. 2007). Thus we apply the rule of decision that the Virgin
Islands Supreme Court would apply in adjudicating issues of
territorial law. The Virgin Islands Code provides that ―[t]he
rules of the common law, as expressed in the restatements of
the law approved by the American Law Institute, and to the
extent not so expressed, as generally understood and applied
in the United States, shall be the rules of decision in the
courts of the Virgin Islands in cases to which they apply, in
the absence of local laws to the contrary.‖ 1 V.I.C. § 4.
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III
A
The District Court granted summary judgment and
dismissed Barefoot‘s copyright claim on the ground that
Barefoot did not own the copyright to the architectural plans
at the time those rights were allegedly infringed, and that it
thus lacks standing to assert a copyright infringement action.
The court reasoned as follows. When Milne originally
created the copyrighted work, he was an employee of Village.
Under the works-for-hire doctrine, Village is presumed to
own the copyrights to works created by its employees during
the course of their employment. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
Plaintiff concedes this much to be true, but argues that
Village effectuated a transfer of the copyright in question to
Barefoot in 1999, such that Barefoot was the rightful owner at
the time that the alleged infringement began. The District
Court disagreed, concluding that there was no evidence to
support such a transfer, and that Barefoot therefore had not
raised a genuine question of fact as to whether it owned the
copyright at the relevant point in time.
Ownership of a copyright is freely transferrable ―by
any means of conveyance or by operation of law.‖ 17 U.S.C.
§ 201(d). However, a transfer (other than one by operation of
law) ―is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a
note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed
by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner‘s duly
authorized agent.‖ 17 U.S.C § 204(a). No such writing
existed in this case until the ―Memorandum of Transfer‖
dated September 9, 2008—nearly nine years after the alleged
8

assignment took place (October 5, 1999), and more than four
years after this lawsuit was filed. So the first question we
must address is whether such a long-delayed memorialization
can successfully validate a long-ago oral copyright transfer.
This being an issue of statutory interpretation, we
begin with the text. Section 204(a)—frequently referred to as
the Copyright Act‘s ―statute of frauds‖—specifically
contemplates a post-hoc ―note or memorandum of the
transfer,‖ as distinct from an ―instrument of conveyance,‖ as a
permissible means of satisfying the Act‘s writing
requirement. The ―note or memorandum‖ does not itself
constitute the transfer; rather, the writing renders valid and
enforceable in court a change in ownership that has already
taken place. See 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer,
Nimmer on Copyright § 10.03[A][3] & nn.20–22 (Rev. Ed.
2009). Under the statute‘s plain terms it is clear that an oral
transfer can be given legal effect by a subsequent signed
writing.
Of course, even under this construction it is possible
for a writing to be simply too far removed in time from the
event it purports to memorialize, so that there can be no
validation of the past event. The Ninth Circuit so held in
Konigsberg Int’l v. Rice, 16 F.3d 355 (9th Cir. 1994), a case
involving novelist Anne Rice‘s alleged oral agreement ―to
sketch out a romantic melodrama involving a love triangle
between a resurrected mummy, an English heiress and Queen
Cleopatra,‖ and to license the story to Konigsberg to serve as
the basis for various derivative works. Id. at 356. The
alleged oral contract granted Konigsberg a two-year period to
exploit its rights, with an option to extend. The only extant
9

signed writing memorializing the contract, however, was a
letter from Rice to Konigsberg‘s lawyer, sent after litigation
had commenced. The letter read, ―as far as I am concerned,
these contracts, though never signed, were honored to the
letter. . . . [The licensees] got exactly what they paid for.‖ Id.
Konigsberg sought to use this letter to prove that Rice had
granted a license, but the court refused to credit that theory.
Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Kozinski argued that
the writing requirement is designed to prevent an author from
―giv[ing] away his copyright inadvertently,‖ to ―force[] a
party who wants to use the copyrighted work to negotiate
with the creator to determine precisely what rights are being
transferred and at what price,‖ and to provide a ―guidepost for
the parties to resolve their disputes.‖ Id. at 357 (quoting
Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir.
1990)). These goals, according to the Ninth Circuit, are only
served if the writing is ―executed more or less
contemporaneously with the agreement‖ and is ―a product of
the parties‘ negotiations.‖ Id.
Konigsberg distinguished the Copyright Act‘s statute
of frauds from its contract-law cousin (which can be satisfied
by a letter like the one Rice wrote, see Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 133 & cmt. b) on the ground that in contract
law, the statute ―serve[s] a purely evidentiary function—to
prevent enforcement through fraud or perjury of fictitious
agreements.‖ 16 F.3d at 357. By contrast, a copyright
assignment is, under the terms of § 204(a), simply ―not valid‖
unless there is a writing. Id. According to the Ninth Circuit,
an oral contract subject to the statute may be valid but
unenforceable in court, but a copyright transfer cannot even
10

take place without a writing. This reading of § 204(a)
compelled the court to interpret the statutory requirements
strictly, so as to demand substantial contemporaneity. So
construed, § 204(a) was not satisfied by ―a letter [that] was
written three and a half years after the alleged oral agreement,
a year and a half after its alleged term would have expired
and 6 months into a contentious lawsuit.‖ Id.1
We consider this analysis unconvincing. To begin,
while the text of the statute (as we observed above) clearly
allows for a subsequent writing to effectuate an earlier oral
transfer, it does not specify a time period during which the
writing must be consummated. Indeed, it does not even
impose
a
fuzzy
standard
like
―substantially
contemporaneous.‖ The Ninth Circuit‘s decision to imply
such a requirement appears to rest entirely on its assessment
of the copyright statute‘s purposes, in contradistinction to
those of the contract-law statute of frauds. According to the
Konigsberg court, the latter serves a ―purely evidentiary
function,‖ while the former has the additional purpose of
―enhanc[ing] predictability and certainty of ownership.‖ Id.
(citations omitted). However, it is not clear that this second
goal is anything more than a rewording of the purpose of
ordinary statutes of frauds. Just as requiring a written
contract prevents enforcement of a nonexistent obligation
through the exclusion of fraudulent, perjured, or
misremembered evidence, requiring a writing for enforcement
of a copyright assignment ―enhances predictability and
certainty of ownership‖ by preventing litigants from
1

The court also observed that the letter was not a product
of negotiations. 16 F.3d at 357.
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enforcing fictitious ―agreements‖ through perjury or the
testimony of someone with a faulty memory. See Victor H.
Polk, Jr. & Joshua M. Dalton, Equitable Defenses to the
Invocation of the Copyright Act‘s Statute of Frauds
Provision, 46 J. Copyright Soc‘y U.S.A. 603, 611 (1999).
That is, the two statutes serve essentially identical purposes,
even if some courts may have phrased those purposes so as to
make them sound different.
Furthermore, to the extent that the Ninth Circuit‘s
argument hinges on a distinction between an oral copyright
transfer not being ―valid‖ and an oral contract simply being
unenforceable, it is a bit hard to discern the practical
difference. As leading commentators have observed, ―[a]
contract is ‗valid‘ [only] insofar as it has legal operation and
‗invalid‘ insofar as it has not,‖ 4 Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on
Contracts § 12.5 (rev. ed. 1997), meaning that a contract
rendered unenforceable by the statute of frauds is not actually
―valid‖ in any meaningful sense. See also id. at n.12 (―[I]t
should not be said that the statute [of frauds] does not affect
the ‗validity‘ of the contract, because validity cannot be
separated from remedy.‖). Accordingly, it is perfectly
reasonable to read § 204(a) as allowing enforcement of oral
agreements through the same sorts of later-drafted, informal
writings that are universally held to satisfy the statute of
frauds in the contract setting.
Other courts, including a differently constituted panel
of the Ninth Circuit in a post-Konigsberg case, have reached
that conclusion—and have done so in circumstances more
closely analogous to our own than those presented in
Konigsberg. In Magnuson v. Video Yesteryear, 85 F.3d 1424
12

(9th Cir. 1996), a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit held
sufficient a writing dated more than fourteen years after the
oral transfer. The plaintiff, Magnuson, was both CEO of the
transferor corporation (Columbus Productions, Inc.) and the
owner of the transferee firm (John Magnuson Associates), but
he did not memorialize the change in copyright ownership at
the time it took place. The defendant in Magnuson‘s
copyright infringement suit argued that the assignment was
invalid and that Columbus therefore still owned the rights.
(Columbus was no longer operating and had no ability to
sue.)
The dissent took the position that Konigsberg
controlled, id. at 1432 (Fernandez, J., dissenting), but the
majority distinguished the case before it on the ground that
―the problem with the writing in that case was not so much
that it was not contemporaneous with the agreement but that
it was ‗not the type of writing contemplated by section 204‘
because it ‗came far too late to provide any reference point
for the parties‘ licensing disputes.‘‖ Id. at 1429 n.1 (majority
op.) (quoting Konigsberg, 16 F.3d at 357). This made a
difference: in Magnuson there was no need for a ―reference
point‖ to resolve any dispute, because no dispute existed: no
one involved in the putative transfer contended that it had not
occurred. See id. The Magnuson court found particularly
compelling the reasoning of Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee
Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 36 (2d Cir. 1982) (citations
omitted):
[S]ince the purpose of the provision is to protect
copyright holders from persons mistakenly or
fraudulently claiming oral licenses, the ―note or
memorandum of the transfer‖ need not be made
13

at the time when the license is initiated; the
requirement is satisfied by the copyright
owner‘s later execution of a writing which
confirms the agreement. In this case, in which
the copyright holder appears to have no dispute
with its licensee on this matter, it would be
anomalous to invoke this provision against the
licensee.
The Eleventh Circuit also follows the rule that an oral
agreement is valid if it is later ratified in writing, see Arthur
Rutenberg Homes, Inc. v. Drew Homes, Inc., 29 F.3d 1529,
1533 (11th Cir. 1994), and has applied it to facts quite similar
to those in the case before us. In Imperial Residential Design
v. Palms Development Group, 70 F.3d 96 (11th Cir. 1995)
(per curiam), Imperial Residential Design drew up a set of
floor plans for Regal Classic Homes. One of Imperial‘s
principals then orally transferred to Regal all of Imperial‘s
rights in the design; both parties believed that the plan
belonged solely to Regal. Regal subsequently discovered a
competitor, Palms Development Group, marketing similar
plans, and sued for copyright infringement. Palms defended
on the ground that Regal did not own the copyright. After the
initial lawsuit had been filed (there were several iterations),
Regal obtained a written agreement that it claimed
memorialized the original oral transfer of Imperial‘s
copyright. The court decided that, at least in a case like that
before it, in which the assignor and the assignee did not
dispute ownership and in fact were both plaintiffs in the same
infringement case, it would not demand a contemporaneous
writing. Id. at 99. In so holding, the court reasoned that ―the
14

chief purpose of section 204(a) (like the Statute of Frauds) is
to resolve disputes between copyright owners and transferees
and to protect copyright holders from persons mistakenly or
fraudulently claiming oral licenses or copyright ownership.‖
Id. Because there was no dispute between the original
copyright holder and the putative transferee, the court thought
that ―it would be unusual and unwarranted to permit a thirdparty infringer to invoke section 204(a) to avoid suit for
copyright infringement.‖ Id. (citing Eden Toys, 697 F.2d at
36).
We agree with the reasoning of Magnuson, Imperial,
and Eden Toys. At least where there is no dispute between
transferor and transferee regarding the ownership of a
copyright, there is little reason to demand that a validating
written instrument be drafted and signed contemporaneously
with the transferring event. No one in the cases just cited (or
in the case now before this Court) has ―giv[en] away his
copyright inadvertently,‖ or lost his chance to negotiate, or
been left without a ―guidepost‖ for resolving a dispute. See
Konigsberg, 16 F.3d at 357. Nor are concerns regarding
certainty compelling: none of the defendants in any of these
cases thought that it owned a copyright, only to find out
through litigation that its claim was invalid because of a snafu
involving the written instrument. All of them knew or should
have known that they were at least potentially infringing
someone’s copyright—even if they perhaps could not be
precisely sure whose.2 Because none of the considerations
2

The defendants in this case contend that they hold a valid
license to make use of the plans that Milne and his associates have
worked up, but we have no need to reach that argument.
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driving Konigsberg‘s insistence on contemporaneity come
into play in a case in which there is no dispute between
transferor and transferee, we hold that a third-party infringer
in such a case cannot evade liability by invoking § 204(a) and
demanding a contemporaneously-drafted instrument.
B
Resolving that legal question does not, however,
necessarily lead to the conclusion that Barefoot prevails here
and that the District Court should be reversed. For a writing
to ―validate‖ a past transfer, the past transfer must have
actually occurred. See Magnuson, 85 F.3d at 1429 (observing
that ―the district court made several factual findings that are
not clearly erroneous indicating that Columbus did, in fact,
transfer its copyright to John Magnuson Associates in the
seventies‖); Imperial, 70 F.3d at 96 (―Both Wilson and
McGuffie testified that Wilson then orally transferred to
Regal all his company‘s rights in the Regency design and that
both believed that the Regency plan was the sole property of
Regal.‖); Rutenberg, 29 F.3d at 1530 (―It is uncontroverted,
however, that Heise and Chrysalis entered into an oral
agreement that Heise would prepare these plans for Chrysalis,
and that the copyright in the ‗Verandah II‘ plan would be
owned by Chrysalis.‖); Eden Toys, 697 F.2d at 36 (holding
that a later writing can validate an earlier transfer, but
remanding to the district court for determination of whether
―Paddington could orally or through conduct grant an
exclusive license to Eden‖). We agree with the District
Court‘s conclusion that Barefoot has failed to raise a triable
issue of fact as to whether the alleged 1999 oral transfer ever
occurred.
16

The purported transfer of Village‘s copyright interest
here is in the nature of an assignment. In contract law, ―[a]n
assignment of a right is a manifestation of the assignor‘s
intention to transfer it by virtue of which the assignor‘s right
to performance by the obligor is extinguished in whole or in
part and the assignee acquires a right to such performance.‖
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 317(1). Analogously,
an assignment of a copyright ―is a manifestation of the
assignor‘s intention to transfer [the copyright] by virtue of
which the assignor‘s [copy]right . . . is extinguished in whole
or in part and the assignee acquires [the copyright].‖ All that
is required for the completion of an assignment is that the
assignor ―manifest an intention to transfer the right to another
person . . . . The manifestation may be made to the other or to
a third person on his behalf and, except as provided by statute
or by contract, may be made either orally or by a writing.‖
Id. § 324. No particular formality is required, except to the
extent required by statute. Id. cmt. a. Thus, anyone with
authority to convey Village‘s property to another3 could have
3

The defendants argue that Milne lacked authority to
effectuate the transfer, because such power was vested exclusively
in Village‘s board of directors acting as a whole. This argument
lacks merit. As an executive officer, Milne was an agent of the
corporation and had the power to bind the corporation to contracts
and to assign its assets. See 2 William Meade Fletcher, Cyclopedia
of the Law of Corporations §§ 434, 437 (rev. ed. 2006) (officers
are agents of the corporation, whose powers are determined by
agency law; ―[t]heir authority may be implied from their conduct
and the acquiescence of the directors‖); Restatement (Third) of
Agency § 2.01 & cmt. b (an agent has actual implied authority both
―to do what is necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish or
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orally assigned the copyright to Barefoot by saying, ―Through
me, Village hereby assigns you its copyright in the Bunge
project design,‖ or other words to the same effect (provided
that Village later backed up the oral statement with a writing).
The complication in this case is that the copyright was
allegedly assigned by Village, acting through Milne, and
assigned to Barefoot, also acting through Milne. Barefoot
nevertheless insists that the transfer of rights occurred orally,
on October 5, 1999, as the Memorandum of Transfer attests.
With the issue so framed, we cannot conclude that the District
Court erred in finding no evidence of a transfer. Barefoot
proffers three possible sources of such evidence, but none is
availing.
First, Barefoot argues that the Memorandum itself ―is
the best evidence of assignment,‖ because both Milne (an
officer, director, and shareholder of Village) and Speer
(Village‘s president, as well as a director and shareholder)
signed a document confirming that the assignment took place.
We disagree. The idea of a memorandum ―validating‖ an
earlier copyright transfer depends on the original transferring
event actually having transpired. In each of the cases cited
above for the proposition that a later writing can confirm an
earlier oral grant, there was evidence of this crucial historical
fact extrinsic to the writing. None of those courts confronted
perform an agent‘s express responsibilities‖ and ―to act in a
manner in which an agent believes the principal wishes the agent
to act based on the agent‘s reasonable interpretation of the
principal‘s manifestation in light of the principal‘s objectives and
other facts known to the agent‖).

18

a case in which it was argued that the same document both
proved that an oral transfer occurred and gave legal effect to
that otherwise unenforceable promise. We do not think that a
―note or memorandum of transfer‖ can simultaneously serve
each of these purposes. If it could, a distantly post-hoc
writing would be capable of rendering enforceable a (possibly
fictional) ―transfer‖ that purportedly took place years or
decades earlier but for which there is no independent
evidence. This would enable a perjured or misremembered
writing to override actual historical events. Suppose, for
instance, that O gave A a written document conveying his
copyright in 2005. Later, out of spite or faulty memory, O
drafts a document purporting to validate a 2004 oral transfer
of the same copyright to B, even though there is no evidence
that this assignment actually took place. If the memorandum
to B were enough to prove that the event occurred, then for
practical purposes A never owned the copyright despite
holding an instrument of conveyance: B holds a document
showing that he took ownership in 2004 and that O therefore
did not have any copyright to assign in 2005. If B‘s
document is enough on its own to prove that the oral transfer
happened, A has no recourse, as there is in all likelihood no
way for him to prove that such an event did not transpire.
Thus B would be able to sue A for infringement despite the
fact that O never actually said anything to him about the
copyright until after he had already given the transferring
instrument to A. This is the kind of result that the writing
requirement is intended to avoid. We should not construe §
204(a) in a way that would permit such an outcome. If
Barefoot is to get past summary judgment it must present
evidence, apart from the Memorandum of Transfer itself, that
19

is sufficient to allow a conclusion that the October 5, 1999
oral assignment actually occurred.
The second proffered bit of evidence for the
assignment is a pair of checks (one from Village to Barefoot,
the other—which appears to have been scratched out, though
not voided—from Barefoot to Village) that, according to
Barefoot, represent consideration from Barefoot to Village for
the transfer of the project in question. However, nothing in
the checks themselves or the relevant deposition testimony
indicates that the checks constituted compensation for the sale
of any copyright. Reading Speer‘s testimony, one gets a
vague sense that the checks were part of the process of
shuffling things around when Village was getting out of the
practice of architecture and Barefoot was starting up, but
there is nothing to link the checks to the copyright. Even if
the checks were part of a general transfer of the project from
one entity to the other, such an exchange would not have
―necessarily required a copyright transfer,‖ as plaintiff
asserts. Barefoot might (for instance) have subcontracted to
work on the project without buying the copyright, or it might
have just exploited the copyrighted material with no right to
do so, hoping that it wouldn‘t be sued. The business
arrangement isn‘t spelled out anywhere, and the record
contains nothing to show that Barefoot bought the copyright.
Thus the checks themselves carry little evidentiary weight.
More to the point, even on the most charitable interpretation,
the checks simply are not evidence upon which a jury could
conclude that Village orally assigned its copyright to Barefoot
on October 5, 1999.

20

Barefoot‘s third attempt at showing that the transfer
occurred hinges on the contract signed by the owners and
Barefoot in August 2000. As just noted, the mere fact that
Barefoot had taken over work on the project does not imply
that Village had orally transferred its copyright on October 5,
1999. And while the contract stipulates that Barefoot ―shall
be deemed the authors and owners of their respective
Instruments of Service and shall retain all common law,
statutory and other reserved rights, including copyrights,‖ that
provision is meaningless if Village (and not Barefoot) owned
the copyright all along. The copyright provision does not
prove, or even suggest, that Barefoot ever owned the
copyright. It certainly is not evidence that the particular oral
transferring event in question actually took place.
Other than the Memorandum of Transfer (which as we
have said cannot stand on its own), none of the proffered
evidence, such as it is, would permit a jury to conclude that
an oral transfer took place on October 5, 1999, as the
Memorandum would have it and as Barefoot has argued.4
4

We note that while Barefoot has not so argued, it is likely
possible for a copyright transfer to be implied from conduct and
then later validated in writing. Eden Toys suggested this
possibility, see 697 F.2d at 36, and generally speaking the intent to
transfer a right may be manifested through conduct. See
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 19 (―The manifestation of
assent may be made wholly or partly by written or spoken words
or by other acts or by failure to act.‖) (emphasis added); 6 Am.
Jur. 2d Assignments § 83 (―Under the appropriate circumstances, a
right may even be assigned without the execution of a formal
assignment.‖). The Copyright Act does not foreclose this
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Summary judgment was therefore appropriate, and we will
affirm the District Court.
IV
Before the case reached the summary judgment stage,
the District Court dismissed the defendants‘ counterclaim for
tortious interference with contractual relations pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6).
A
The relevant provisions of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, §§ 766 and 766A, have not been abrogated by local law
and thus control our analysis. 1 V.I.C. § 4. Section 766
requires, as an element of the cause of action, that the
defendant cause a third party not to perform its obligations
under a contract.5
The District Court dismissed the
possibility: it provides that copyrights ―may be transferred in
whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of
law.‖ 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (emphasis added). Plaintiff here has
not, however, taken this route, and we will not consider whether it
would have been availing.
We also observe that it might be possible for a court to
recognize equitable exceptions to § 204(a)‘s writing requirement.
See generally Polk & Dalton, supra. But again, Barefoot has not
advanced such an argument.
5
Section 766 (―Intentional Interference with Performance
of Contract by Third Person‖) reads in full:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes
with the performance of a contract (except a
contract to marry) between another and a third
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counterclaim on the ground that it does not allege that anyone
failed to perform any contract. Defendants/counterclaimants
do not dispute this conclusion; rather, they argue that the
District Court erred in relying solely on § 766, to the
exclusion of § 766A.
Section 766A (―Intentional Interference with
Another‘s Performance of His Own Contract‖) does not
require a failure to perform:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes
with the performance of a contract (except a
contract to marry) between another and a third
person, by preventing the other from
performing the contract or causing his
performance to be more expensive or
burdensome, is subject to liability to the other
for the pecuniary loss resulting to him.
The plaintiff can only recover, however, if the defendant‘s
interference made it more expensive or burdensome for the
plaintiff to perform. Distinguish the two sections thusly: §
766 allows a plaintiff to recover if a third party fails entirely
to perform (because such nonperformance actually harms the
plaintiff, whereas simply making a third party‘s life more
difficult does not necessarily injure anyone else), while §
person by inducing or otherwise causing the third
person not to perform the contract, is subject to
liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting
to the other from the failure of the third person to
perform the contract.
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766A allows the plaintiff to recover if he himself was forced
either to fail to perform under a contract or to perform under
more expensive or burdensome circumstances (because the
plaintiff‘s nonperformance or extra expense actually harms
him).
The nature of the counterclaim makes clear that the
defendants were attempting to invoke expense and delay,
rather than nonperformance, as the origin of their damages.
They allege that Barefoot ―engaged in a course of action and
communications to the Commissioner of the Virgin Islands
Department of Planning and Natural Resources‖ that ―was
designed and calculated to delay and interfere with the
permitting process for the construction‖ project, that in fact
Barefoot‘s conduct did cause delays in permitting and
construction, and that these delays led to monetary damages.
The defendants emphasize that the gravamen of their harm is
the delay in permitting and the consequent delay in
construction. This allegation fulfills the elements of § 766A.6
B
Barefoot does not dispute this conclusion on the
merits. Instead it contends that the defendants‘ § 766A
argument is waived because they did not adequately raise it in
6

We note that because a plaintiff can only recover under §
766A if the defendant‘s actions made the plaintiff‘s own
contractual obligations more difficult or expensive, any relief
obtained via this counterclaim should be limited to those parties
whose own performance was hindered by the alleged delays in
permitting.
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the district court.7 We disagree. While waiver ordinarily bars
raising new arguments for the first time on appeal, this rule
―is one of discretion rather than jurisdiction,‖ Selected Risks
Ins. Co. v. Bruno, 718 F.2d 67, 69 (3d Cir. 1983), and it may
be ―relaxed whenever the public interest . . . so warrants.‖
Rogers v. Larson, 563 F.2d 617, 620 n.4 (3d Cir. 1977). The
waiver rule applies with greatest force ―where the timely
raising of the issue would have permitted the parties to
develop a factual record.‖ In re Am. Biomaterials Corp., 954
F.2d 919, 927–28 (3d Cir. 1992). The public interest is better
served by addressing § 766A than by ignoring it. The waiver
rule serves two purposes: ensuring that the necessary
evidentiary development occurs in the trial court, and
preventing surprise to the parties when a case is decided on
some basis on which they have not presented argument. See
Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556 (1941). Neither of
these aims would be furthered by invoking waiver here. The
posture of the case vitiates the first: evidence is irrelevant to a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and we are presented only with the
purely legal question whether Count V of the counterclaim
states a cause of action. And there can be no plausible claim
of surprise or prejudice, because although the defendants‘
district court briefing invoked the wrong definition of the tort,
the counterclaim itself alleges damages resulting from delay
and added expense. It thus plainly means to invoke the §
7

The defendants‘ district court briefing on the subject
quoted only cases requiring nonperformance, as per the § 766
definition. See Pourzal v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 60229, at *7–8 (D.V.I. 2006) (requiring nonperformance);
Gov’t Guar. Fund of Fin. v. Hyatt Corp., 955 F. Supp. 441, 452
(D.V.I. 1997) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766).
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766A definition of the tort. We do not deem the § 766A
argument waived.
C
Barefoot next argues that because the counterclaim
was not filed until March 9, 2007, the applicable two-year
limitations period bars claims that accrued before March 9,
2005. See 5 V.I.C. § 31(5)(A). Because we are considering a
motion to dismiss, our review is restricted to the face of the
counterclaim. See, e.g., Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128,
135 (3d Cir. 2002); Bethel v. Jendoco Constr. Corp., 570 F.2d
1168, 1174 (3d Cir. 1978) (―If the [statute of limitations] bar
is not apparent on the face of the complaint, then it may not
afford the basis for a dismissal of the complaint under Rule
12(b)(6).‖). The Virgin Islands applies the discovery rule to
tort suits, such that the statute of limitations is tolled ―when
the injury or its cause is not immediately evident to the
victim.‖ Joseph v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 867 F.2d 179, 182 (3d
Cir. 1989). The date of discovery is not evident from the face
of the counterclaim, which avers only that the defendants
―discovered recently‖ that the plaintiffs had engaged in a
tortious course of action. Thus the pleading does not reveal
when the limitations period began to run, and the statute of
limitations cannot justify Rule 12 dismissal.
D
Because the tortious-interference counterclaim
survives all the challenges that Barefoot has raised against it,
we will vacate the District Court‘s dismissal.
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V
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the District Court, on
its own motion, dismissed the counterclaims for breach of
contract and of fiduciary duty, on the ground that no federal
law claims remained in the case and that continuing to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the territorial law
claims was unwarranted. The owners argue that jurisdiction
is nonetheless proper on the basis of diversity of citizenship,
28 U.S.C. § 1332: Bunge and Friedberg, the only
counterclaimants with an interest in the breach claims, are
California citizens, and Barefoot is a Virgin Islands citizen.8
Generally speaking, the dismissal of the complaint
―will not preclude adjudication of a counterclaim over which
the court has an independent basis of jurisdiction.‖ Rengo
Co. Ltd. v. Molins Mach. Co., Inc., 657 F.2d 535, 539 (3d Cir.
1981). It is unimportant for this purpose that Roberts and
Springline (both Virgin Islands citizens) are listed in the case
caption (thus apparently destroying the complete diversity
required by Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267
(1806)), because we are focused on whether jurisdiction
exists with respect to the individual counterclaim, rather than
with respect to the case as a whole. Had they filed first, the
owners could have invoked § 1332 to bring their breach
claims in federal court in the first instance, and Barefoot
could have filed its causes of action as counterclaims. As
things actually transpired, the owners were forced to file their
8

Each of these counterclaims also places more than the
$75,000 jurisdictional threshold in controversy. See 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a).
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breach claims as compulsory counterclaims, because they
arose out of the same ―transaction or occurrence‖ as
Barefoot‘s complaint.9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a). The owners
should not be deprived of a federal forum, to which they
otherwise would have been entitled, because Barefoot‘s initial
complaint named a non-diverse defendant who has no part of
the owners‘ claims (except perhaps as a witness).
This conclusion does have an unusual consequence
with respect to the tortious-interference counterclaim
(discussed in Part IV, supra) asserted by all four defendants.
Suppose that the owners had initiated the lawsuit by filing a
complaint invoking diversity jurisdiction and asserting only
the territorial law causes of action that presently remain
before this Court. Rule 24(b)(1)(B) would appear to permit
Roberts and Springline to intervene in order to assert their
tortious interference claims against Barefoot. Those claims
would need a basis of jurisdiction, and the only possibility
(there being no diversity or federal question) would be
9

To be deemed part of the same ―transaction or
occurrence,‖ a claim need only ―bear[] a logical relationship to‖
the subject matter of the complaint. Xerox Corp. v. SCM Corp.,
576 F.2d 1057, 1059 (3d Cir. 1978). Such a logical relationship
exists where separate trials on each of the claims would ―involve a
substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the
courts.‖ Id. ―In short, the objective of Rule 13(a) is to promote
judicial economy, so the term ‗transaction or occurrence‘ is
construed generously to further this purpose.‖ Transamerica
Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Aviation Office of Am., Inc., 292 F.3d
384, 389 (3d Cir. 2002). This is clearly the case here, and there is
no dispute that the counterclaims are compulsory.
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supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. But in a
case in which the district court‘s jurisdiction is based upon
diversity, § 1367(b) denies the district courts supplemental
jurisdiction ―over claims by persons seeking to intervene as
plaintiffs under Rule 24 . . . when exercising supplemental
jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the
jurisdictional requirements of‖ the diversity jurisdiction
statute. The upshot is that if the owners had filed first,
Roberts and Springline could not have piggybacked on their
co-plaintiffs‘ diversity action.
Yet in the case that is actually before the Court,
Roberts and Springline have not been made parties under any
of the Rules subject to § 1367(b)‘s jurisdiction-stripping
provision10; rather, they are defendants and Rule 13(a)
compulsory counterclaimants. See United Capitol Ins. Co. v.
Kapiloff, 155 F.3d 488, 492–93 (4th Cir. 1998) (―[T]he
limitation of § 1367(b) applies only to plaintiffs’ efforts to
join nondiverse parties.‖) As the Fourth Circuit observed, the
limits on supplemental jurisdiction were ―designed to prevent
plaintiffs from circumventing the requirements of diversity.‖
Id. at 493. But ―because defendants are involuntarily brought
into court, their joinders and impleaders were not deemed as
suspect as those of the plaintiff, who is master of his
complaint.‖ Id. Roberts and Springline did not voluntarily
avail themselves of the federal forum; they were named as
defendants and were forced to raise their compulsory
counterclaims or lose them.
Accordingly all four
defendants/counterclaimants can use the breach of contract
and of fiduciary duty causes of action (which are properly
10

That is, Rules 14, 19, 20, and 24.
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before the court pursuant to Rule 13(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1332)
as anchor claims to which they may attach their resurrected
tortious-interference-with-contract cause of action under the
supplemental jurisdiction statute. Federal subject-matter
jurisdiction thus attaches to all three territorial-law
counterclaims.
VI
To sum up: We will affirm the District Court‘s
judgment as regards the summary judgment motion on the
copyright claim. We will vacate the District Court‘s Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal of the tortious-interference-with-contract
counterclaim and its dismissal of the breach of contract and of
fiduciary duty counterclaims. We will remand those three
counterclaims for consideration on the merits.
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